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AbstractWhile scholars, soldiers and politicians have argued about the international consequences of American
grand strategy, relatively little attention has been paid to the potential domestic consequences of American
hegemony versus isolationism. This paper is an effort to start the process of understanding the relationship between
American primacy (the current strategy) and its domestic impact. It looks at general areas of measurement,
economic and social indicators, to determine if primacy has a positive or negative impact on the American people.
Though additional research is necessary, this paper suggests primacy has not had the negative consequences
suggested by proponents of isolationism.
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I. Introduction“In the course of a single century, America has transformed itself… from a country
relatively isolated in the Western Hemisphere into a power of unprecedented
worldwide reach and grasp.” - Zbigniew Brzezinski1
The United States stands atop the pinnacle of international power and influence, the
acknowledged potentate of the international community.2 While the duration and the long-term
impacts of this unique situation are not known, one fact is: hegemony is not free. America’s decision to
maintain its international primacy is not one without cost, real and opportunity. This paper seeks to
explore the price of pursuing a grand strategy of primacy on the United States’ domestic population,
specifically in contrast to the expectations of another grand strategy on the opposite end of the
spectrum, isolationism.
The costs of primacy are a frequent topic among academics, with the discussion typically
focusing on the impact of American foreign policy on the international system as a whole.3This focus is
understandable, as the topic of primacy falls under the general umbrella of grand strategy, an
international relations concern. Yet, the pursuit of primacy abroad does not occur free from domestic
pressures.4 As a representative democracy, the U.S. polity can significantly influence the actions America
undertakes abroad.
Because of this influence, it becomes critical to understand the value of primacy from a
domestic perspective, specifically in comparison to, isolationism. If scholars and policy makers are to
comprehend the true impact of America’s pursuit of international primacy and its sustainability, they

1

Brzezinski, Z. “The Grand Chessboard” p. 3
Brooks, S. and Wohlforth, W. “American Primacy in Perspective”
3
Please see examples such as Brooks, S. and Wohlforth, W. “American Primacy in Perspective”, Jervis, R. “International Primacy: Is the Game
Worth the Candle?”, Layne, C. and Thayer, B. “American Empire: A Debate” and other notable scholars.
4
Hill, C. “The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy” p.220
2
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must understand its value to the American people. Does it make America wealthier, absolutely or
relatively? Does it contribute to American’s sense of happiness and well-being? Are domestic programs
ignored because of expenditures abroad?
Testing primacy against these questions is the purpose of this paper. If isolationist theory holds
true, we will expect to see negative correlations for each measured metric, economic or social.The
outline is as follows: first, an overview of key concepts and terms to facilitate understanding. Following
thedefinitions is a review of the current literature addressing some of the pressing questions associated
with domestic populations and the pursuit of primacy. Finally, the first portion of the paper concludes
with a methodology review, explaining the process used during the course of research.
The second half of the paper focuses on reviewing various studies and measurements of U.S.
domestic health. There is a separation of economic and social factors, each further divided into three
sub-components. Counter-arguments are then addressed, followed by the general conclusions of the
work.
II. DefinitionsA logical place to begin a discussion on the value of primacy is by defining the term itself. At its
simplest, primacy is “the fact of being pre-eminent or most important.”5 In the arena of grand strategy,
this definition provides an excellent starting place, indicating America is first in importance in the
international community. In the context of this paper, it should also be understood to mean the United
States possesses the ability to “effectively resolve important international issues alone."6
To declare American primacy is to say the United States is first in the international community in
terms of importance and power. It possesses sufficient hard power to influence international events

5
6

Oxford Dictionary, “primacy”.
Huntington, S. “The Lonely Superpower”
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where and when it deems it necessary. To suggest primacy does not mean America possesses unlimited
or unchallenged power, but rather the United States has no existing equals on the international stage.
The world is no longer bi-polar or multi-polar, but uni-polar under an American hegemony.
A second key term to understand is the concept of isolationism. Isolationism as a concept has
become an oft-bandied phrase in the American political arena, typically hurled at a politician accused of
backwards thinking in American economic or foreign policy matters. At its roots, however, isolationism
claims to be centrally focused on American needs.7
Isolationism as a grand strategy recommends the United States focus on domestic concerns and
limits its involvement in foreign affairs. This means a significant draw down of military spending
(typically to 1.5% or so of GDP), withdrawing from foreign alliances like NATO and focusing on a single
security deterrent, America’s nuclear arsenal.8 As a nation, America would turn inward, leaving the
world to balance its own threats without hegemonic intervention on the part of the U.S.
Finally, isolationism sees international interventions and engagement as posing both direct and
opportunity costs to the domestic health of American society.9The reasoning is basic: if we are spending
money abroad, we are not spending it at home. This means domestic programs, like education and
crime prevention, are going to be negatively impacted. While perhaps oversimplifying the calculus, this
is the heart of the negative domestic tradeoff isolationism cites as a major reason for keeping America
out of foreign entanglements.
Primacy and isolationism stand on polar opposites ends of the engagement spectrum for
American foreign policy. Since the purpose of this paper is to test some of isolationism’s premises where
domestic health is concerned, primacy was selected as the most obvious counter-example. Additionally,

7

Posen, B. and Ross, A. “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy”
Ibid
9
Nincic, M. “Domestic Costs, the U.S. Public, and the Isolationist Calculus”
8
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because the United States is currently pursuing primacy, there is sufficient data available for measuring
selected metrics.
The third term requiring defining is domestic health. America’s standing in the international
community is measured in terms of military expenditures, weapon systems capabilities, the strength of
its alliances and the robustness of its economy. Domestic health is a measurement of the absolute and
relative well-being of the American domestic population. It includes such measures as per capita GDP,
crime rates, education rates, health rankings and other indicators.
Domestic health is an attempt to measure the overall robustness of America society. Since
societal health is a complex issue, there are no doubt alternative methods to measure it than what is
proposed here. This is acceptable, since the definition used for this essay defined by the measurements
used, namely crime rates, education rates and happiness.
III. Literature ReviewBefore moving to the methodology and evidence portion of this work, it is important to provide
a context for the arguments made. To this end, there are at least three questions which need to be
answered: first, what does existing IR theory say about the link between domestic and foreign policy;
second, does the United States possess primacy; and third, what do scholars believe the impact of
primacy is on the U.S. population, from both an isolationist and primacist perspective. This section seeks
to address each of these concerns.
International relations (IR) theory, by definition, is focused on the foreign policy decisions of
actors on the world stage, whether they are states, MNC’s (multi-national corporations) or international
institutions. Finding the answers to questions like “How do actors make decisions,” “What forces guide
those choices,” and “What is the structure of the international system,” form the basis of most IR
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theorists’ work. This second query, “What forces guide actor choices,” is where this essay finds
foundation in IR theory, as it deals with the potential domestic consequences of a specific foreign policy:
the pursuit of primacy.
Within the scope of IR theory, the link between domestic and foreign policy is typically unidirectional: domestic policy influences foreign policy, with the strength, scope and manner of influence
dependent on the school of the theorist. This thesis argues such a belief is unsophisticated, and the
eventual hope is to show there are correlations between some foreign policy decisions and domestic
measures. Before this argument can be made, it is necessary to evaluate how the major IR schools treat
the relationship between domestic and foreign policy. These schools are realism, liberal-institutionalism
and constructivism.
Realism is the oldest of all IR schools, forming the basis of IR theory in general.10 It has five basic
principles which form the foundation of the theory: the international order is anarchic, power is relative,
the primary actor is the state, states will act in a rational self-interest and finally, states are unitary.11
While there are many branches of “classical” realism, most IR theorists who identify as realists would
generally accept the aforementioned tenets. Of the five, the one most relevant to this thesis is the
concept of unitarity.
The concept of ‘unitary’ refers to the idea of or concept of unity.12 From the realist perspective,
this means a state acts as one entity primarily in response to external rather than internal forces.13
While a realist may view domestic politics as a subtle influence on what a state decides is rational selfinterest, the most important forces will be external threats. This is the reason the primary topic of

10

Holsti, O. “Theories of International Relations”
Ibid
12
Oxford English Dictionary, “Unitary”
13
Holsti, O. “Theories of International Relations”
11
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discussion for realist theorists is resolving the security dilemma and not deciding how local elections are
going to frame the national debate on the environmental impacts of nuclear weapons.
It should be noted realist theory is not entirely dismissive of domestic issues, as there is one
area of domestic concern which plays a significant role in realist theory, especially among the newer
branches: political economy. As mentioned previously, solving the question of the security dilemma is of
primary concern, with most answers including the need for a strong military. Since it is difficult to pay
for tanks, ships, planes and nuclear weapons without money, the relative health of a nation’s economy
is a matter of importance. In this, realism shares commonality with the other IR schools, such as liberalinstitutionalism.
Liberal-institutionalism came to prominence in response to realism. Dissatisfied with the
explanations provided by the realist school, liberal-institutionalism seeks to explain the international
order through state preferences, decided by a combination of hard and soft power interactions,
including domestic concerns. Just as in the realism camp, there are divisions among liberal theorists, but
they tend to share at least three basic principles: the world is a global community made up of varying
cultures, economic systems and government types; there are other issues besides the war/peace debate
which merit serious attention; and the nation-state is not the only actor on the world stage.14
For the purposes of this paper, the liberal-institutional approach to IR theory captures many of
the potential impacts of domestic policy on foreign policy. Like realism, liberalism recognizes the
importance of the economy, specifically the potential of economic ties to bind foreign actors together.15
Additionally, factors such as local culture and governance style contribute to the foreign policy decisions
of the state actors. One final component of liberalism worth mentioning is the role of non-state actors,
such as MNC’s.
14
15

Ibid
Ibid
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Since liberal-institutionalism recognizes the potential role of non-state actors on the
international order, is it important to highlight one group of these actors: multi-national corporations
(MNC’s). MNC’s are capable of influencing world affairs because of their large resources, their intimate
ties to the global economy and their ability to provide leverage against state-level actors.16 This is
important because from a U.S. perspective, some of the nation’s largest drivers of domestic business
also have very large international footprints.17 If the nation decided to pursue foreign policy objectives
which are damaging to these groups, it is reasonable there would be some kind of formal or informal
push-back.
The final school of IR theory addressed here is constructivism. Compared to realism and liberalinstitutionalism, constructivism is a relatively new school.18 Rather than focusing on the static structures
of the international order, constructivist theorists view concepts like anarchy, power and national
interest as ideas to be reevaluated at need.19 Additionally, where realism and liberalism tend to assume
a sort of universality of their definitions, constructivist theory suggests ideas and perceptions of the
world are subjective, i.e. power for the U.S. could be a different concept than power for another state
actor.
From a domestic policy standpoint, it is east to see how a constructivist may see a link between
the domestic and the foreign. If terms like allies and enemies are fluid and socially defined, the local
domestic politics of a nation could have serious impacts on the foreign policy decisions made by state
actors. For example, if a local U.S. politician decides to change the name of French fries to freedom fries,
it could spark a reaction among the domestic polity to see France as an enemy instead of an ally, despite
the historical relationship between the two nations. This in turn could cause a strain on the working

16

For an excellent example of the latter, please see Thomas Biersteker’s work on Nigeria and MNC’s during the 1970’s.
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Ibid
17

10

relationship between diplomats between the two nations, leading to less productive discussions, or
even hostility or lack of support for various international initiatives.
There are other IR theories, and there are sure to be concerns this work does not treat them all.
Such an endeavor, while noble in its desire for completeness, is unnecessary within the framework of
this essay. The purpose was to show the existing relationship between domestic politics and foreign
politics according to modern IR theory, which tends to be one-way: the domestic impacts foreign policy
with very little said about the flipside. It is the author’s hope this paper can be a beginning point in
providing additional context to the conversation about domestic and foreign policy links, specifically in
the arena of American grand strategy.
The second question which needs addressed is whether or not America has primacy. As
mentioned previously, primacy is when a single international actor, typically a state, possesses sufficient
capabilities to be pre-eminent on the world stage. The U.S. must possess sufficient resources, will and
international reputation to act where and when it desires to, in a manner consistent with its national
objectives.
While some scholars may also argue primacy should include additional restrictions suggesting
the nation state considered ‘primarch’ possess unlimited or unchallenged power, this essay reject this
view.20 Instead of looking to a mythical overlord of the international order such a definition conjures,
this thesis prefers to use Kenneth’s Waltz’s polarity argument as a framework. Waltz, a realist, argued
the international system could be divided into polarities to describe various balances of power.21
These polarities traditionally include at least a bi-polar system and a multi-polar system. An
example of the bi-polar system would be the Cold War, as the United States and the U.S.S.R. stood on

20
21

Primarch is the term used to describe the nation which currently possesses the attributes of primacy as defined herein.
Waltz, K. “Theory of International Politics”
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opposing ideological ground and in large part dictated, or at the very least heavily influenced, the
foreign policy of the nation-states within their spheres of influence. A multi-polar world could be the
world immediately before WWI, where several great powers had significant influence, suggesting an
anarchical environment.
Within this context, there is another polarity suggested by primacy: uni-polar or global
hegemony. The uni-polar system would have a single actor capable of influencing the rest of the world’s
actors with either soft or hard power capabilities. There is not the chaos of the multi-polar system and
there are not other super-powers to directly challenge the will of the primarch as would be the case in a
bi-polar system. While this primarch would not be able to do whatever it wished in the world at large,
there would be no doubt its influence was the strongest felt and its preferences most likely to be
enacted.
It is against this definition of primacy, the uni-polar world, the United States should be
measured. When examining the world’s stage of actors it becomes readily apparent America has met
the definition since the fall of the Soviet Union. Its culture and influence have permeated most of the
world’s nations and it is America’s vision which tends to guide international policy. For evidence of the
first, two metrics are helpful if unconventional: McDonald’s revenues and box office receipts.
McDonald’s, an American MNC selling American cuisine in the form of hamburgers, makes more
money overseas than it does domestically.22 It is not a small margin either, with almost seventy percent
of revenue generated outside of the United States.23 While this oversimplifies the corporation’s strategy
of adding local food items to the menu, the fact remains burgers and fries have become a common part
of the world’s understanding of food.

22
23

Associated Press “McDonald’s global sales by region”
Ibid
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The second metric is box office receipts. Of the top grossing films of all time, all ten were
produced by American media companies.24 Of the total receipts, an average of sixty-six percent of profit
came from overseas (non-American) markets.25 The total amount of money foreigners spent on these
top ten movies is approximately $23,366,700,000 in fifteen years.26 The world is a voracious consumer
of American media.
What does this mean in terms of influence for the United States? One of the nation’s largest
corporations has a presence in one hundred and twenty-one nations outside of America, with the
working relationships with government ministers and other business owners this implies. Considering
the influence corporations are able to exert on American politicians, it would not be a stretch to suggest
this same influence can be used overseas. McDonald’s and its executives are unofficial ambassadors of
American economic interests.
The influence of media outlets is perhaps more subtle, but no less impacting. When American
‘blockbuster’ films are examined for thematic elements, they tend to contain some common themes:
self-determination, clear divides between good and evil, distaste for tyranny.27 These messages are
generally in line with America’s ideological foreign policy objectives and they are being consumed by
foreign audiences at an impressive rate. Intentional or not, people in the international community are
paying for the right to be indoctrinated with America’s values.
For many scholars, the above examples will elicit at best a roll of the eyes and a heavy sigh while
they search for more ‘meaningful’ proofs of American primacy. The focus is on whether or not America

24

Boxofficemojo.com
Ibid
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can exercise its will abroad, when and where it chooses to so. The answer appears to be yes, in most
cases. The evidence for this is one country: Iraq.
The United States went to war in Iraq in 1991 and again in 2003. Both times they were part of a
coalition force, both times they sought international approval for their plan and both times they were
the major provider of troops and logistical support. This would be remarkable if the story ended there,
as what other nation has been able to garner international approval and alliance support to
preemptively attack a nation state on the other side of the globe not once, but twice in a decade?
What makes these experiences an even stronger case for American primacy is the 2003
invasion. Despite being rejected by the United Nations in its desire to seek a military solution to Iraq, the
lack of support by major allies like France and Germany, and the outright hostility of other international
players like China and Russia, the United States still put together a ‘coalition of the willing’ and invaded a
sovereign state 6,200 miles away. Objectively speaking, if any other nation had attempted to do this, it
would be quite reasonable to suggest they would find themselves on the wrong end of the world’s
pointiest stick.
Yet, what were the consequences for America? Did Russia or China threaten military action?
Were there embargoes put in place, even after the nominal reason for military action was found to be
somewhat lacking in support?28 Was America now a pariah state isolated from the international
community?
The answer is clearly no. While there have been international consequences for America’s
decision to invade, the nation’s alliance structure remains robust and it still possess the largest economy

28

A reference to then Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations indicating America had found evidence of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD’s) being housed by Iraq, a clear violation of earlier accords.
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in the globe, unhampered by international sanctions on trade.29 The fact that America could engage in
legally questionable military action such a long way from home over the course of a decade without
becoming severally isolated is a powerful argument the country stands as the world’s foremost
international power.
There are those who will continue to argue America does not now, nor has it ever, enjoyed
primacy on the international stage. Refuting their claims would take at least a book, and doing so is not
the purpose of this essay. The desire, rather, is to argue it is reasonable to suggest America has been,
and perhaps still is, in a position of primacy. The author believes this goal has been accomplished
satisfactorily.
The last major question which needs to be answered before presenting the gathered evidence is
whether or not the questions of this thesis have already been answered by other scholars. What does
the academic community have to say about the domestic impacts of primacy? Largely, the group is silent
with two notable exceptions: The Limits of Power by Andrew Bacevich and American Empire: A Debate
with Bradley Thayer and Christopher Layne.
Upfront, it is important to understand where these men stand. Dr. Thayer believes America both
possesses primacy and the pursuit of it is in the best interest of American citizens. Col. Bacevich and Dr.
Layne are a little more uncertain about the extent of American power abroad, but both agree primacy
and the pursuit of it is not in the best interests of Americans, especially abroad. With the lines drawn, it
is now possible to examine what they say about the potential domestic impacts of this particular foreign
policy strategy.

29
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Bacevich, a retired Army colonel, is clearly against America’s pursuit of primacy. He blames
America’s foreign policy on a bloated bureaucracy, an over-powered executive branch and Americans
pursuit of material appetites.30 What is interesting about this formula is once again foreign policy is a
result of domestic pressures.
How foreign policy, specifically the pursuit of primacy, impacts the domestic population is
largely un-quantified. While Bacevich believes the relentless pursuit of commercialism will prove the
destruction of American society, there is little discussion of specifics.31 Bacevich’s view is that of an
isolationist. He expects primacy to caused serious harm to American domestic life.
To support this argument, Bacevich cites examples of growing American debt (public and
private) and the nation’s growing dependence on foreign nations to support its energy needs.32 From
this viewpoint, the United States is economically weaker and at a serious disadvantage in the
competitive marketplace. It is a small leap, logically speaking, for an isolationist to suggest these
warning indicators, like debt, are the harbingers of domestic malaise. Pursuing primacy, from an
isolationist standpoint, will weaken key aspects of American domestic life.
American Empire: A Debate is a conversation between two scholars on opposite sides of the
fence where the pursuit of primacy is concerned. Both authors have the opportunity to present their
initial arguments and then rebut their partner’s view a single time. On the whole, the arguments for and
against primacy again focus on the international consequences, with domestic benefits or costs being
logical deductions of the primary arguments.

30

Bacevich, A. “The Limits of Power.”
Ibid
32
Ibid. Pg. 43-44
31
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For example, Dr. Layne suggests pursuing primacy will lead to a revolt in the international
community against American exceptionalism and hard power.33 America will lose standing in the
international community and find itself cut off from many of the opportunities it enjoys now. We will
become the oppressors which need to be thrown off.34
Again, this is an isolationist argument suggesting active engagement in international affairs will
lead to negative consequences. As previously noted, Layne’s focus is predominately on specific
international blowback, but he does make broad allusions to domestic consequences. From the
perspective of isolationism, one could extrapolate the negative international consequences of primacy
to domestic affairs, suggesting primacy as a grand strategy is a detriment to the whole of American
society.
From Dr. Thayer’s perspective, the opposite is true. Primacy is a positive benefit for both
Americans and the international community as a whole because it provides stability, a better
government and economic prosperity.35 Thayer, like Bacevich, spends time tracing the origin of primacy
and finds its roots in American history rather than rampant consumerism.
Similar to The Limits of Power, Thayer and Layne’s work speaks of benefits or costs in broad
strokes from an American domestic perspective. They discuss the creation or maintenance of
international systems, with the domestic benefits/costs alluded to but never specified. Perhaps both
authors felt their arguments were self-evident as they pertained to domestic matters, or more likely,
domestic concerns were not the primary focus of their discussion.
Whatever the reason, there appears to be a gap in the existing literature where primacy and its
domestic consequences are concerned. This is unfortunate, since it seems the government of any nation
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has a responsibility first to its citizens and second to the international community. When discussing the
value of a foreign policy strategy or decision, the first question should be “How will this impact our
citizens?”
This is not to suggest decision making can be done in a vacuum. Quite the opposite is true, as
the author believes just as there are foreign policy implications of domestic pressures, there are
domestic consequences of foreign policy decisions. Indeed, the purpose of this paper is to better
understand the relationship between domestic factors and a single, though very important, foreign
policy strategy: primacy. Hopefully this work can act as a starting point for future research and
discussions of not just the impacts of primacy, but foreign policy as a whole.
IV. Methodology ReviewIn order to begin a discussion of the methodology it is necessary to define and defend the date
ranges used during the measuring process. The periods of American history which could be realistically
labeled as isolationist pre-date the modern global system of politics and economies which renders
comparisons with the primacy era problematic. The bi-polar era may be employed as a reasonable
substitute for the isolationist era for two reasons: it better resembles the hegemonic era in key
economic and political measurements; and it is more defensive in posture, aligning more closely with
isolationism than primacy does, allowing for a meaningful comparison.
Based on this logic, the measurements selected for comparison in this thesis begin in 1980, the
height of the Cold War and the bi-polar system, and then track costs across subsequent decades through
2010, depending on the metric and the availability of data. Primacy is assumed starting in 1991 (the fall
of the Soviet Union). This process is generally used for both the economic and social indicator metrics.
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For some, 1980 may be seen as the start of American primacy and so the costs of the decade
should be assigned to America’s pursuit of primacy and not its maintenance of the bi-polar system. This
view is incorrect based on two crucial points: America’s primary strategy during this period was
containment, which is defensive in nature; and the cost and frequency of international engagements
have increased significantly since 1991.
Containment, the grand strategy of America which led to the downfall of the Soviet Union and
the undermining of communist ideology worldwide, was at its heart, passive diplomacy.36 As originally
proposed by George Kennan, containment was an effort to respond to Soviet territorial aspirations with
a defensive posture.37 America would not aggressively try to ‘liberate’ communist influenced territory,
but rather hold the line against future spread and let the communist ideology kill itself off.
Containment was made for a bi-polar world. America would face off against the only other
superpower, with the intent to prevent the spread of Soviet influence, not to create American
hegemony. This key point is the core of the differences between bi-polar spending and primacy
spending. Primacy seeks dominion in some form, containment of the bi-polar era wishes for a status quo
of power.
This philosophy continued to throughout 1980’s. While America supported anti-Soviet efforts in
places like Afghanistan, the nation did not go to war six thousand miles from home in an effort to topple
governments deemed as threats. Indeed, this passivity was a major sticking point for containment’s
detractors who wished to see a more aggressive and assertive foreign policy.38 They would get their wish
as America started to pursue primacy in the decade following the U.S.S.R.’s collapse.

36
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In the 1980’s, America formally went to war zero times. There were troops deployed overseas,
support was provided to anti-communist factions, and the nation did involve itself militarily in the
western hemisphere, but there were no wars. In the two decades since 1991, America invaded Iraq
twice, provided air-support to Bosnians and Libyans, and invaded Afghanistan. There has been a pivot
from maintaining the existing world order to creating a new one more amenable to U.S. interests.
The costs of these wars have not been insignificant. Again, formal war spending during the
1980’s was zero dollars. The total cost of all wars fought during the containment era (four decades) is
$1,084 billion.39 The cost of wars since America has aggressively pursued primacy is $1,207 billion, in just
half the time.40 The nation’s pursuit of primacy is currently on pace to double military spending where
direct conflict is concerned.
On a final note, the increase in war spending during the decades where America has pursued
primacy aligns well with isolationist expectations. Isolationism expects active foreign policy costs to
exceed more passive strategies. On a scale of active strategies, primacy is at the extreme end, more
active and aggressive than any other, including the bi-polar strategy of containment. This is why 1980
was chosen as the comparison year, because it allows a contrast of American domestic health during
periods of various grand strategies, with the isolationist expectation being a worsening of domestic
health during periods of more active foreign engagement.
Isolating data which represents domestic measures is the second task of the methodology set.
How to measure the impact of primacy on America’s population is a difficult task, but not impossible.
One can measure the amount of resources being spent on various categories, and then sort those
categories in a logical and meaningful fashion. Once sorted, the various grouping and sub-groupings can
be compared and contrasted, revealing trends and possible tradeoffs. This is the approach taken by this
39
40
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paper, as it offers perhaps the simplest way of understanding the complex relationship between
international primacy and domestic health.
The primary concerns with such an approach are the validity of the data sets and the quality of
the categorizations. To address these concerns, the following actions have been taken: first, all of the
data in this paper is culled from widely respected sources. Examples include the World Bank, various
U.S. governmental agencies and respected non-profits such as SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute.) While the interpretation of the data in this paper is subject to thorough review, the
sources should be considered reputable.
Second, great care has been taken to create meaningful and useful categories for each metric.
They fall primarily into two categories: economic indicators and social indicators. The economic
indicators are per capita GDP, foreign direct investment levels and spending on social programs
(education, health services). Social indicators include crime rates, education rates,and happiness
rankings. Both sets of indicators are examined from an absolute and a relative perspective.
If the design itself is valid, the crucial question becomes, why? Why select the metrics measured
in this work? The answer to this question is threefold: the first and most important reason is because
these metrics seem to capture what American citizens would say is important to them; the second
reason is there appears to be a logical correlation between the metrics and foreign policy; and finally,
the availability of data.
First, from a subjective view, Americans seem to be interested in both their economic and their
social well-being. When comparing the most searched items on Google for 2012, we find U.S. citizens
worried about both social and economic concerns with issues like abortion, immigration, gas prices and
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the national debt all making the top ten.41 This would seem to indicate any effort to understand the
impacts of a specific foreign policy effort has to address both economic and social concerns.
From an economic perspective, three metrics stood out in importance and data availability: per
capita gross domestic product (GDP), foreign direct investment (FDI) and overall levels of government
spending. Per capita GDP provides a good baseline of the general economic success of a nation, foreign
direct investment measure the trust the U.S. economy has overseas and government spending helps
track the ‘guns versus butter’ debate. In addition to these general benefits, there are perhaps more
subtle insights to be gained.
As an example, FDI not only measures foreign trust, it is a good indicator of societal stability and
relative economic strength. Companies do not like to see their money wasted, and governments with a
strong rule of law and stable societies tend to be more favorable investing climates in the long-term. If
the United States had significantly higher levels of FDI, it could suggest other nations recognize there are
societal strengths which provide unique economic benefits.
Some may argue companies are going to simply maximize profits and so will invest where there
are few regulations and high potentials for a quick return. This mindset suggests the U.S. is actually a
worse social environment if it had high levels of FDI. It is also false.
While there are certainly short-term profit maximizing schemes involving high risk investments,
MNC’s are not built on a quick buck. Solid companies, like solid structures, require a steady foundation,
in this case reliable long-term investments. With this in mind, the paper seeks to measure consistent
levels of FDI over multiple decades, suggesting there is something unique about American society which
promotes long-term ROI (return on investment). If there are consistently higher FDI rates, and they
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correlate with the years America has possessed or pursued primacy, it would suggest primacy is good for
the American economy.
From a social measure standpoint, a similar thought process guided the selection. Again there
are three metrics this paper seeks to measure over time: crime rates, education rates and overall
American happiness. Crime rates help track domestic safety, education rates indentify the future
potential for competitiveness at home and abroad while happiness is pretty self-explanatory: are
Americans happier in an age of primacy?
From an objectivity standpoint the social measures are somewhat more complicated, simply
because it is difficult to prove causation between a single foreign policy objective and a social
measurement. Crime rates, for example, are a result of many factors. Still, there is an inherent logic
behind the crime rate and education level metrics: if there are limited resources to spend and pursuing
primacy costs resources, is it worth the cost?
The question becomes about the tradeoff between pursuing primacy and some other foreign
policy strategy. When America pursues primacy, does it generate more opportunities and resources
than it spends when compared to an alternate foreign policy strategy? Additionally, if America pursues
primacy, does this negatively impact its ability to provide safety (measured via crime rates) or
competitive potential (measured via education levels) to its citizens when compared to other nations,
who are not pursuing primacy?
Of all the metrics chosen, the most tenuous link is certainly between American levels of
happiness and the pursuit of primacy on the international stage. Happiness itself is an almost ethereal
concept to many, as what makes one individual happy would be considered a living hell to someone
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else.42 Still, if there are significant swings in the levels of American happiness between years where the
nation pursued primacy versus an alternate foreign policy strategy, it would be telling. Such a shift
would be a strong argument there is a link between foreign policy decisions and their domestic impacts,
even if those impacts can not quite be operationalized.
On the whole, the process used to compare and contrast the various economic and social
metrics is sound. The chief concern is in the selection of the metrics themselves, with five out of the six
having strong historical or logical reasons (perhaps both) for being included. The sixth, happiness, is
somewhat more difficult to pin down but still provides useful context. Since this paper represents what
may rightfully be considered a first effort into tracing primacy’s impacts on the American domestic
population, these tradeoffs should be acceptable and may invite future debate and analysis of the topic.
IV. The Importance of Domestic Health“The only orthodox object of the institution of government is to secure the greatest
degree of happiness possible to the general mass of those associated under it.”- Thomas
Jefferson43
A government’s first, and some would argue only, priority is to see to the welfare of its
citizens.44 This involves insuring their physical security, and in the United States, “promoting the general
welfare.”45 It can reasonably be argued ‘general welfare’ refers to the health of domestic society, and is
a distinctly separate duty than ensuring security from international threats. However, it would be
incorrect to assume these governmental responsibilities are not linked.
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The general welfare of society is certainly tied to its security. While Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy
has been challenged over the years, it is difficult to reasonably suggest an individual will enjoy happiness
to its fullest extent if he or she is being physically assaulted by a foreign soldier. Likewise, the experience
of the former Soviet Union demonstrates when a government over allocates its economic means heavily
into military might, the domestic population suffers relative to other nations with less aggressive
military expenditure programs.46
As noted previously, the debates about primacy in the realm of grand strategy tend to focus on
the international consequences of America’s pursuit and maintenance of hegemony, predominately
negative from the isolationist standpoint. This leaves unexplored the relationship between primacy and
domestic health, something which this papers hopes to begin to remedy. To do so, it first looks at the
potential domestic economic impacts and then turns to the potential social consequences of American
hegemony.
a. Economic Indicators“The economy, stupid.” – James Carville47
When examining the domestic health of the United States, the first place to begin is with the
economy. As several notable politicians have discovered, economic prosperity is one of, if not the most,
important concerns of the U.S. polity.48America’s economic strength is also directly tied to its military
capabilities, as it is difficult to pay for military hardware without an economy.
This section examines some of the important indicators used to determine the overall
robustness of an economy and how the United States chooses to spend its wealth. It begins with an
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overview of the absolute size of the American economy, moves into per capita GDP and FDI and then
concludes with an examination of governmental spending.
In absolute terms, the economy of the United States of America is the largest the world has
seen.49In relative terms, America’s economy is larger than the next two nations, China and Japan,
combined.50 The U.S. economy accounts for over twenty-one percent of the world’s economic might.
There is little question America is an economic powerhouse.
Per Capita GDPSince it is established the American economy as a whole is the largest and most robust, the next
question is how do its citizens fare compared to the rest of the world. Figure 1 shows the relative per
capita GDP of the top twenty nations and China.51The United States ranks 15th out of the world’s
nations, with the second largest absolute economy, China, ranking 90th.
To better understand this data, it is necessary to also understand population totals for each
nation, as shown in Figure 2.The United States is the 3rd most populous nation. According to the data, it
also has the best GDP per capita ranking of the most populous nations.52
Finally, before interpreting the data, it is important to understand where the United States was
before primacy was established. According to the IMF, America ranked 9th in per capita GDP and 1st in
overall size of the economy in 1980.53 1980 can be defended as a representative year for multiple
reasons: it was during the height of the Cold War when the USSR was still a legitimate threat, providing
the framework for a bi-polar international order; it is far enough after the economic devastation of
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World War II to offer a reasonable comparison of other major world economies; and it is the oldest
reliable data set from the IMF.

GDP per Capita Rank by Nation
115,809

48,328
5,417
China

France

Germany

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 90

Japan

8

Belgium

Sweden

7

Ireland

Denmark

6

United States

United Arab…

5

Finland

San Marino

4

Singapore

Australia

3

Austria

Switzerland

2

Netherlands

Norway

1

Canada

Qatar

US$
Luxembourg

140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0

Thailand

D. R. Congo

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Turkey

Russia

8

Iran

Bangladesh

7

Germany

Nigeria

Egypt

Pakistan
6

Ethiopia

Brazil
5

Vietnam

Indonesia

3 4

Mexico

United States

2

Philippines

India

1

Japan

China

Population in Millions

Population by Nation
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0

Population

What does this data mean? First, from an absolute perspective, the United States is better off
economically today than thirty years ago when using GDP as a measure. The per capita GDP has
increased almost four times in the last three decade, for a high of $48,328 compared to the $12,249 in
1980.5455 If primacy is a contributing factor, these results run counter to isolationist expectations.
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Absolute values do not tell the entire story. Discounting inflation rates, purchasing power and
other historical economic factors, America seems to be relatively weaker economically than its peers
who did not pursue primacy. First, the GDP per capita indicates a relative weakening, as the United
States slipped from 9th to 15th in world economies.56While the nation as a whole became richer, its
citizens are relatively worse off today than they were thirty years ago, based on GDP.
Second, while per capita GDP did grow, it did not grow as fast as other developed economies.57
Only focusing on the top twenty per capita GDP’s in 1980 and 2011, the U.S. grew at a rate of 3rd
slowest.58Only Qatar and the UAE grew more slowly, and their absolute values are at least twice the
value of America’s. Excluding oil/finance economies, the U.S grew at an average of 3.9 compared to 4.4
for the other top twenty nations.
The data on per capita GDP seems to indicate if pursuing primacy does impact a nation’s
economy, it does so in two ways. First, the absolute economy is strengthened, perhaps because the
nation in question is able to maintain a stable international order facilitating trade. The world as a whole
gets richer, America included. This is interesting, because in stands in contrast to what could be
expected from an isolationist perspective.
The second potential impact seems to be the weakening of a nation’s relative position in the
world economic hierarchy as it pertains to per capita income. One possible reason for this could be the
cost of maintaining primacy is more expensive than maintaining a bi-polar system. This would fit neatly
into isolationist expectations.
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These costs could be real or opportunity. For example, a real cost could be increased military
expenditures. An opportunity cost may include the decreased likelihood of other nations to work with
American economic interests as backlash against American foreign policy.59 The true causes will require
more research, perhaps in subsequent studies.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)The second area of focus is foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI refers to the willingness of multinational corporations (MNC’s) to invest in markets and manufacturing outside of their native country.60
These companies do so “in the expectation of realizing a higher rate of return than a given home
country firm with an equivalent investment.”61 FDI can be interpreted as an assumption there are better
returns on investment in one nation’s economy versus the home nation. To put it another way, FDI can
be a crude measure of international confidence in a given nations’ economy.
FDI is important because corporations are in the business of making money, and as a general
rule, they seek to maximize their profits wherever possible. If one nation has significantly higher FDI, it
could indicate there is an international trust or expectation of a more robust economy. Figures 3 and 4
show FDI rates for 1980 and 2011, respectively.62
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These graphs seem to indicate a similar relationship to what was observed with per capita GDP,
with some exceptions. First, while there is again an absolute increase and a relative decrease when
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comparing 1980 to 2011, America is still ranked second overall in the most recent data set. Second,
while other nations also increased their FDI, the United States has a clear advantage in percent of
increase. With the notable exception of Luxembourg, America outpaces almost every other nation in
percent of increase from 1980 to 2011.
Again, the trends in FDI across decades are interesting. From an isolationist perspective, one
would expect a significant negative decrease in FDI as a result of pursuing primacy. As other nations
chaff against American rule, they will look for any opportunity to oppose American power, such as
reducing direct investment in the American economy. This has not been the case.
There appear to be real economic benefits of keeping the United States involved in the
international arena, in contrast to what would be expected from an isolationist point of view. Indeed,
this seems to reinforce one of the common critiques of isolationism as a grand strategy: while there may
be limited savings in withdrawing from the military, the savings do not outweigh the potential benefits
of maintaining a strong international position.63
Why this is the case is an interesting question. For America, being at the top of the international
food chain does seem to offer incentives for cross-border investment. Perhaps primacy affords the
American economy a degree of stability or desirability for foreign MNC’s. The old adage of “everyone
likes to bet on a winner” certainly seems to influence foreign company investment strategies.
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Government SpendingThe final area of economic consideration is U.S. government spending in bi-polar years
compared to now. Since it would be misleading to use dollar amounts for comparison, the data is
displayed in terms of % of the overall U.S. GDP. Figure 5 contains the details.64
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From the data above, we notice several relevant points: first, defense spending has decreased as
a percentage of overall GDP since 1980. Second, the largest increases have come from social spending;
primarily in health care, pensions and welfare. Third, both the federal deficit and overall spending versus
GDP have increased.
Comparing these results to isolationist predictions yields at least two conclusions: first, military
spending is not more costly as a percentage of the economy, which counters the expectation. Second,
social spending has also not suffered, which again runs counter to the expectation. Why this is so bears
additional investigation, but there are a few preliminary possibilities.
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Our first possible explanation is primacy is a cheaper economic option than a bi-polar world.
This could be because of the absolute benefits to the world economy as a result of a benign liberal
hegemony. Perhaps the world takes its cue from the free market principles established by the American
hegemony, with nations seeking to follow the economic footsteps of the world’s largest economy.
A second possible explanation is there does appear to be a peace dividend for the United
States.65 Without a significant military threat, the federal government has increased spending in social
programs over the past three decades. Being in a position of primacy could theoretically allow the
United States more flexibility when seeking to address threats, and because of the uni-polar nature of
the international system, those threats are inherently less severe.66
Another alternative may be a uni-polar system is more stable than the bi-polar one which
preceded it, allowing more nations to focus on commerce instead of war. As a result of this stability,
America can leverage economic interests abroad, allowing it to cheaply borrow funds to sustain social
spending levels. While not noted on these charts, the public debt has also increased significantly over
the past thirty years, equaling approximately ninety-three percent of America’s GDP in 2010.67 In 1980,
it was approximately thirty-three percent.68
Isolationism would argue America is reaching overstretch, as its empire requires more resources
to support than its citizens are willing to expend.69 Perhaps another possible explanation relates back to
a potential underlying cause for such high FDI rates: because America has the trust of the international
community, it can receive funding (loans) with little effort. The nation is perceived as a comparatively
65
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sound investment by other governments willing to buy U.S. debt. America spends because it can. The
long term consequences of such an approach are unknown, and bear further research.
Based on the analysis of the economic data, it would appear primacy does not negatively impact
the American population from an absolute economic perspective. GDP, FDI and government spending
on social programs have all increased in the time the United States established hegemony. The relative
costs of primacy are more difficult to assess, but it would appear primacy may put Americans in a
relatively weaker position compared to their international peers.
Why the difference between the absolute and relative gains is an interesting question. Perhaps
it has something to do with the nature of American primacy. There seems to be an underlying desire of
the United States to elevate other nations to the same economic and political status it enjoys.70 A likely
consequence of pursuing this course would be the increase of other nations’ prosperity, impacting the
relative balance of power.
This data does indicate isolationism’s expectations for significant negative domestic impacts due
to a pursuit of primacy are perhaps out of step with the reality of the economic indicators. While there
have been relative losses in GDP and FDI compared to other nations, it is difficult to suggest these are
severely impacting Americans negatively. The economy has grown, allowing for decreased military
spending as a percent of GDP and increased health and social service spending compared to the bi-polar
years. There are just no clearly negative correlations, which is opposite of what isolationism predicts.
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b. Social Indicators
“Happiness is the meaning and the purpose of life, the whole aim and end of human
existence.”- Aristotle71
Determining domestic health is not solely measured by the strength of a nation’s economy.
While economic prosperity is an important component, it is only one of several measures.72The UAE may
be one of the richest nations on earth, but most Americans would not want to relocate their families
there.
This portion of the paper seeks to measure some of these other metrics, specifically crime rates,
education rates, and happiness. As mentioned previously, these three cover various aspects of a society
and have at least some data already assembled across numerous nations for the past few decades. It is
possible other metrics could be used as social indicators of societal health, which will be left to
subsequent studies. The methodology for this portion is similar to the analysis of economic factors,
focusing on both absolute and relative changes. The first area of examination is crime rates, followed by
education rates and overall happiness.
Crime RatesAs a measure of societal health, crime rates are a key metric. They provide insight into a
government’s effectiveness in providing domestic security and sufficient economic and social programs
to prevent or deter illegal activities. If the pursuit of primacy negatively impacts a nation’s ability to
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deter crime, this would be a serious concern. What is the point of security abroad if it does not ensure
safety at home? Figure 6 provides U.S. crime rates for 1980, 1990 and 2010.73
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This chart indicates violent crime has significantly decreased since 1980 both generally and
specifically for the major measures. It appears the pursuit of primacy in the current international climate
does not negatively impact the U.S. government’s effectiveness in maintaining peace at home. Indeed,
the United States is more peaceful now by a significant margin, something not predicted by isolationist
theory.
An additional observation about the data: the greatest spike in violent crime occurred during a
transition phase for the United States (1990). The cause of this is unknown, but perhaps it is related to
the Cold War coming to an end and America having to redefine its role in the international arena.
Transition periods in the international arena tend to be prone to more conflict, and if international
policy can impact domestic health, perhaps the state of the international system also subtly influences
domestic life. Further research is required to provide a more concrete answer.
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The next query for crime rates is to compare American crime to other nations. This is a
challenging task, because many of the nations which would offer the most meaningful comparisons
don’t provide public access to this data. A partial solution to this is contained in Figure 7, which contains
homicide rates across several different mostly western nations, as these countries provide the most
available access.74
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The graph indicates at least two points: first, America’s homicide rate is significantly higher than
the norm for western nations. Second, America enjoyed the most significant decrease in homicides from
1980 to 2010. What can be understood from this at it relates to primacy?
First, perhaps America’s preeminent position on the world stage during both the bi-polar and
hegemonic stages have prevented it from focusing on its domestic agenda to the same extent as similar,
though less prominent, nations. This conclusion would mesh neatly with isolationist predication and
bears further analysis. It would be interesting to compare the violent crime rates of the United Kingdom
and the U.S. during Britain’s hegemony to see if this is a trend of nations pursuing primacy.
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Second, if there are domestic costs of international prominence, primacy seems to be a cheaper
route than maintaining power in a bi-polar system. America reduced its homicide rate over fifty percent.
The only nation to create a relatively safer society was Japan, with the U.K. even slightly increasing over
this same period of time. These gains seem to refute the isolationist expectation that American citizens
are inherently worse off when actively engaged abroad.
EducationThe second social indicator is education. Education rates are a general indicator of a society’s
ability to compete in the international arena and develop future human capital. The education metrics
used are a composite of adult literacy rates and the UN’s Human Development Index education
components.75 Figure 8 contains the details, focusing on the same nations used for the crime rate
comparison.
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Based off of this data, America has not suffered from a general education standpoint as a result
of pursuing primacy. According to the HDI measurements, America currently stands above all but three
other nations in the world.76 U.S. adult literacy rates also remain very high, with ninety-nine percent of
the population considered literate.77
What is not measured by the UN HDI is the quality of education. It is quite possible Americans
spend a lot of time in school (primary, secondary and tertiary), but receive an inferior level of education
in comparison. This may be likely, as the United States ranked 25th in math and 20th in science based on
a 2009 world test.78Whether primacy is a factor is unknown, as data for these scores only goes back to
2000, making qualitative comparisons to a pre-primacy state not possible.
American HappinessThe final metric examined is happiness. It is last for two reasons: it is the most subjective of the
measurements and it is perhaps the most pertinent. As the United States seeks primacy abroad it may
make the nation wealthier and allow more social spending, but do Americans consider themselves
happier as a result? Politics, domestic and international, are largely a matter of perspective. If
Americans’ don’t perceive themselves as happier despite objective evidence indicating increased wealth
and education, primacy may not be considered a successful strategy by the polity.
It is important to explain where the data on happiness comes from. Because happiness is
subjective, there is a plethora of ways to try and measure it. This paper uses the World Database of
Happiness, which is a collection of over 1485 studies from 1135 publications covering one hundred
forty-nine nations across forty years (1970-2010).79 The data is collected through surveys using
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questions based on self-ratings with a scaled measurement.80 There are multiple questions examining
various facets of happiness, combined into a single rating.81
This approach helps mitigate some of the inherent subjectivity associated with measuring
happiness, in part by providing enough data to increase statistical significance. The nations used for
comparison are similar to those used to compare education and crime rates for consistency’s sake. The
data is contained in Figure 9.

Happines by Nation Over Time
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Interestingly enough, American happiness seems to have risen at a quicker pace than other
nations. U.S. citizens are happier now compared to 1980, a trend approximately fifty percent of the
measured populations did not enjoy.82From a relative perspective, Americans were behind twenty other
nations in 2010, but ahead of one hundred and twenty-eight countries. Unfortunately, there is
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insufficient historical data from 1980 to determine if America’s relative global rating has improved or
declined in the subsequent decades.83
It appears the impact of primacy on happiness is mixed. American’s are happier now than they
were thirty years ago, and the nation enjoys a relatively respectable raking among peer states. This
relative placement is difficult to assess without historical data, however, making it impossible to say
with a degree of certainty whether pursuing primacy has helped or hindered American happiness. What
can be said with confidence is the trend in American happiness does stand in opposition to isolationist
expectations, as Americans declare themselves happier compared to a bi-polar era, even when the
nation is at war abroad.
From a social indicator perspective, primacy has not dramatically impacted in negative ways the
domestic health of the United States. It is generally positive, not negative trends that mark these
decades. Crime has decreased, education is more available and Americans rate themselves as generally
happier than during the height of U.S. – Soviet tensions in 1980. Just as with the economic indicators
though, these absolute gains seem to come with relative costs.
While America has improved in most social metrics, it still is not as safe, educated or happy as
other developed nations. Americans have fewer homicides today than in 1980, but the homicide rate is
still more than twice as high as other Western nations.84 The availability of education has improved
while its quality is either stagnant or inferior to the system of thirty years ago. Finally, happiness has
increased, but Americans are less happy than nations like Costa Rica and Canada.85 It would be plausible
to argue that pursuing primacy has not been without domestic costs.
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VII. Counter ArgumentsIn presenting the research and metrics, the intent has been to be as open as possible about the
potential concerns associated with the study. While these have been addressed briefly throughout the
essay, there are two potential arguments against the validity of the work which bear greater scrutiny:
are domestic populations really impacted by foreign policy decisions? Were the metrics selected
representative of the potential correlation between primacy and domestic concerns?
The most important argument to address first is the assertion there is little if any connection
between foreign policy decisions and domestic issues. There will be those who suggest the links are
tenuous at best, perhaps even non-existent. In response, there are three examples which should
elucidate beyond reasonable doubt the potential impact for foreign policy on a domestic population:
war generally, the fall of the Soviet Union and the 1973 oil embargo.
If an individual wishes to believe foreign policy decisions do not impact domestic populations,
the best place to turn is the history books under the topic of ‘war’. Of all of the man-made disasters
experienced by the civilizations of the world, none has been more destructive generally speaking then
war between societies.86 The last global conflict of the 20th century cost between fifty and seventy
million lives worldwide and 4.104 trillion dollars for the United States alone.87
These costs are only the direct costs. Economic theory uses a measure called opportunity costs
in an effort to determine the potential outcomes between various courses of action. In terms of
opportunity costs, WWII was also devastating. There were economies to rebuild, societies which had
been shattered and the overturning of the world order.
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While most would argue the conflict was necessary and the outcomes even beneficial for many,
it would be foolish to suggest the decision to engage in war by any of the parties did not impact their
respective domestic populations. With military spending approaching 36% of GDP, the U.S. government
certainly had to divert resources away from domestic spending.88 War, foreign policy taken to the
extreme, certainly has domestic impacts.
It should be clear war is at the extreme end of the spectrum, and not all foreign policy will have
the same kind of dramatic domestic consequences. Other more seemingly benign pursuits are not
without their costs, though. Take as an example the fall of the Soviet Union.
In December of 1991, the Soviet flag was lowered for the last time over the Kremlin. What
caused the dissolution of America’s mightiest opponent of over forty years? While the answer is
complex, most scholars will point to at least three factors: a failed economic system, overextensions of
their military power and a local population unwilling to accept the half-way approach of Gorbachev’s
glasnost.89
In brief, here were the consequences of Soviet pursuit of power in a bi-polar system: they spent
more money than they could afford on military expenditures. The war in Afghanistan was particularly
costly, and the empire never fully recovered. With increased military spending, the government had to
cut back on luxuries like bread and heating oil, and the population responded poorly.
In an effort to appease restless members, then leader Mikhail Gorbachev tried to introduce
economic easing and greater political freedoms. These acted as a “Pandora’s Box” resulting in ever
increasing clamor for more liberalization. Unable to keep pace with the new demands, the government
eventually collapsed.
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The takeaway from this is the reinforcement of the potential impact on domestic populations of
foreign policy pursuits. In the case of the former USSR, more was spent than could be afforded on
empire, and the internal cohesiveness of society suffered as a consequence. In the end, chasing after
power contributed to the eventual collapse of the state.
One final example close to home will help close out the defense of the concept foreign policy
can impact domestic populations. In 1973, the Arab oil producing nations cut off the flow of oil to the
United States as a response to continued U.S. support of the Israel, namely the supplying of weapons
during the 1973 war.90 The impact was dramatic and wide spread.
From a domestic perspective, the shock was severe. Gasoline queues became the norm and fuel
rations were re-introduced. While the crisis was eventually resolved it had long-term consequences: the
embargo caused a shift in attitudes towards the Middle East and a desire for energy self-reliance. If the
U.S. ever achieves energy independence, the roots will be traced to the events of 1973.
To answer the question “Does foreign policy impact a domestic population?” Yes, yes it does.
Indeed, even if it is not war or open conflict, the consequences can be quite broad. While all of the
examples cited above have illustrated negative possibilities, this does not have to be the case. Indeed, as
the initial research showed, it is quite possible pursuing primacy results in improved economic
conditions for a nation.
The second significant concern requiring additional rebuttal is whether the metrics selected
herein are an accurate reflection of the domestic health of the United States. There are other
meaningful social and economic metrics which bear evaluation: poverty, life-span, cost of living,
joblessness, inequality and myriad others. This effort chose crime rates, education levels and happiness
because there was data available and they each correlated to a meaningful aspect of American society.
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The other metrics were not rejected due to inadequacy but rather limits on the scope of this
essay. This thesis is intended as an initial offering in examining the potential impacts of primacy on the
American domestic population. It is hoped additional research will be done which can more broadly
encompass the key components of a society’s health.
VIII. Conclusion“We cannot be any stronger in our foreign policy -- for all the bombs and guns we may
heap up in our arsenals -- than we are in the spirit which rules inside the country.
Foreign policy, like a river, cannot rise above its source.” Adlai Stevenson II
The purpose of this paper was to explore the link between America’s domestic welfare and its
pursuit of primacy abroad, specifically against the backdrop of isolationist expectations. The rationale
for the research is simple: if pursuing strength in the international arena weakens the United States at
home, primacy is a poor strategy. After considering various economic and social factors, this appears not
to be the case.
In absolute terms, America is domestically better off today when compared to its standing in
1980, or even 1990. The United States had made great gains in economic factors such as GDP, FDI and
social spending since achieving primacy in the international order. Additionally, social measures such as
crime rates, education rates and happiness indexes all point to a citizenry which is better off today than
it was thirty years ago.
Isolationists might claim the absolute growth in metrics like GDP would have been larger if a
different foreign policy strategy was pursued. This claim is theoretically possible, but complicated, as
there is a strong argument to be made via hegemony theory the global absolute growth was made
possible by American primacy, not despite it. From an isolationist standpoint, substantial absolute
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growth goes against expectations, as isolationist theory would have predicted a dip. Even with
mitigating factors in place, isolationism seems to fail to adequately predict the domestic outcomes of
primacy as a grand strategy.
With this evidence in place, one could expect this paper to unreservedly declare the pursuit of
primacy in America’s best interest, in firm defiance of isolationism. This is not the case, as there appears
to be relative costs to pursuing and maintaining a benign hegemony. Economic indicators illustrate
these opportunity costs most clearly; specifically America’s declining relative strength in per capita GDP.
We have made the world richer, and as a result, the nation is relatively weaker today than it was thirty
years ago.
So, what is to be done? Should the United States withdraw from the pursuit of primacy and
allow a new hegemony under different leadership to arise? While China is popularly offered as
America’s inevitable replacement, there is always the chance they will be unable or unwilling to be the
world’s policeman. If such was the case, the international order would most likely be more chaotic and
conflict ridden than it is today. Even if the PRC did step into the role, there is no guarantee a Chinese
hegemony would be conducive to American domestic health.
Such possible futures don’t bode well for American prosperity. Neither Chinese leadership nor
anarchy seems likely to offer the same kinds of advantages to American interests as the existing
hegemonic order. It would appear the best way to promote domestic prosperity is to ensure the existing
free market system and security structures remain intact. America will pay a relative cost to ensure
absolute gains.
Does American primacy promote domestic welfare? The answer is still incomplete. Primacy does
not seem to inhibit positive benefits for the United States from a domestic perspective, but the
opportunity costs and alternatives are still largely un-quantified. Considering the ramifications of
46

American primacy on domestic and international policy, additional research to provide a more
conclusive answer seems prudent.
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